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Posts Tagged ‘Advocacy’

Anemia Drug Update

Posted by medconsumers on June 1, 2007

On May 10, 2007, the FDA held an emergency meeting of its Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee to discuss the anemia drugs that supposedly help people cope with chemotherapy. But several recent studies were halted prematurely because these drugs—Epogen, Procrit, Aranesp—caused an increased death rate, cancer progression, deep-vein blood clots and heart damage (see last month’s newsletter). Ultimately, the FDA advisory committee asked for better studies and voted to put more stringent warnings on the labels for these drugs, known collectively as EPO. Unfortunately, few doctors ever read warning labels (one in ten, according to one survey), and the FDA has no authority over how they prescribe drugs.

As is often the case with drugs found to be risky long after they came on the market, the future of EPO comes down to money. There are huge financial incentives for oncologists to overprescribe EPO. Amgen and Johnson & Johnson, makers of EPO, sell their drugs directly to doctors and thanks to rebates (a.k.a. kickbacks) from the drug companies, many oncologists are making a fortune.

That was made clear the day before the FDA meeting in a front-page New York Times article entitled, “Doctors Reaping Millions for Use of Anemia Drugs.” A former business manager for a six-oncologist practice in the Pacific Northwest provided the Times with documentation showing that the six doctors received $2.7 million from Amgen for prescribing $9 million worth of its drugs last year. The rebates are available for cancer drugs other than those self-administered by the patient. The rebates are in addition to the reimbursements doctors get from Medicare and private insurers.

Normally, the FDA steers clear of drug costs, sticking solely to safety and efficacy issues, but the Times article loomed over the FDA meeting. When the advisory committee discussed how to inform patients of the adverse effects of EPO, one oncologist said it should be left to doctors. But another committee member Otis Brawley, MD, head of Atlanta’s Grady Hospital, objected. “The problem is at my hospital doctors get $1200 for every dose they give patients. And they don’t have to sign conflict-of-interest statements like we do,” he said, referring to the FDA requirement that each committee member reveal any financial ties to drug companies prior to participation.

Another oncologist on the committee expressed fury about the uncertainties regarding the safety of the doses currently in use. “Yes, we have a burning question: Are these drugs killing people?” asked Silvana Martino, MD. “What are the doses that are reasonable and appropriate?”
The misleading EPO advertising aimed at the public would never have come up at this meeting were it not for consumer advocates. Five advocates attacked Johnson & Johnson’s ads for Procrit, which fraudulently sold the drug as the cure for chemotherapy-induced fatigue in an ad campaign that ran from 1998 to 2005. They pushed the FDA to force Johnson & Johnson to mount a corrective ad campaign because there is no proof for its claim.

There is no proven quality-of-life benefit for EPO. The drugs were initially approved as a safer alternative to blood transfusions for a chemotherapy-induced drop in red blood cells. But transfusions are not as risky as they were 15 years ago when the first EPO was approved. One basic question lingered: What is the purpose of this drug?

Answers will take years, but Wall Street reacted immediately. Within days of the FDA meeting, Amgen shares dropped more than 15%.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers© June 2007

Posted in Advocacy, Cancer | Tagged: , , , , | Comments Off

Support for FDA Regulation of “Home Brew” Diagnostic Tests

Posted by medconsumers on February 8, 2007

Support for FDA Regulation of “Home Brew” Diagnostic Tests

On February 8, 2007, the FDA held a meeting to discuss the agency’s plan to regulate certain diagnostic laboratory tests for cancer and many other diseases. The central question of the day was:  Should the FDA have regulatory power over “home brew” tests, which are multi-gene profiles? These tests will be used to diagnose cancer, determine the most effective treatment, as well as seeing who is at high risk of getting the disease. Traditionally, the FDA has not regulated tests, such as these, that are not done in one central lab. However, the agency has recently designated these tests, called in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays, as devices. This opens the door to regulation.

At the public comment portion of the meeting breast cancer advocate, Helen Schiff, presented her position on behalf of the Center for Medical Consumers. Her testimony follows:

My name is Helen Schiff. I am a breast cancer survivor and a member of SHARE a breast and ovarian cancer organization in New York City. I am also a patient consultant for the FDA.

The potential for complex biomarkers known as IVDMIAs (In vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays) to change the face of breast cancer treatment is tremendous. For too long we have been plagued with a one size fits all approach to treatment. Even though many women are cured with surgery they have to suffer through radiation, chemotherapy, and 5 years of hormonal treatment because there is no way to know with certainty what treatment a woman really needs, IF ANY. While this treatment strategy has had a small impact onbreast cancer mortality, it has meant that many women have been exposed needlessly to the lethal and life altering effects of all these modalities. Just to name some of the worst ones: leukemia, cardiomyopathy, endometrial cancer, stroke, pulmonary embolism, infertility, lymphedema, “chemobrain,” and loss of libido.

So we welcome a new technology that has the potential to customize our treatments. To give us only what we need. To even tell us which chemotherapy, hormonal treatment, monoclonal antibodies, or small molecule will be optimal for our specific tumors. And we know that in the future IVDMIAs will also have the potential to find breast cancer earlier than is now possible and to do a better job than the Gail model at determining who is really at high risk for getting breast cancer.

Nevertheless, it is very important to be aware of the pitfalls that have plagued biomarker research over the years. In almost half a century of breast cancer biomarker research only TWO biomarkers have proved to be of clinical value: ER and Her2. The significance of what PR means is still disputed. We know for a fact that problems with assays have led to erroneous assessments, less than optimal treatment, and most importantly, premature loss of many lives. Unfortunately, recent studies indicate that there are still problems, for example, with accurate ER and Her2 assays. For example the cut point for ER positivity varies from 1 to 25% of cells with estrogen receptors. A recent study showed that 20% of Her2 tests were not accurate. As many have said, a treatment is only as good as its biomarker, and hence they too need to be rigorously regulated.

One of the most important recommendations of the National Breast Cancer Coalition’s Strategic Consensus Report on Breast Cancer Biomarkers is “to incorporate the best components of drug development to guide the development and validation of biomarker assays.” This new FDA Guidance for IVDMIAs is an important first step in that direction. It will assure that IVDMIAs are: 1) examined before they are marketed; 2) that their results are reproducible by an independent body; 3) that they are tested for accuracy; and 4) that they have clinical relevance. The writing of the IVDMIA label, as with new drugs, must be over seen by the FDA to ensure that there are no false claims and that the results of an INDMIA assays are understandable to both doctors and patients. It is clear to me that neither CLIA, the Federal Trade Commission, nor any other agency in HHS has the depth of the experience, the capabilities, or the resources to undertake such a job, nor do they have the regulatory power.

One need only look to the Ova Check experience to see why this kind of regulatory power is so important. Ova Check was developed as a blood test for the early detection of ovarian cancer in high risk women by Correlogic, a private company, in partnership with scientists from the FDA and the NCI. However, the FDA said that it would not allow Ova Check to be marketed until it published clinical evidence that it WORKED in patients. Keith Baggerly, a bioinformatics specialistat MD Anderson, when trying to replicate the study, found, among other problems, that test results were influenced by the order in which the assay was run. According to an article by David Ransohof in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute Ova Check had not been properly validated its finding in an independent data set and there was a possible problem with over-fitting and bias. Three years later, it has still not been approved to be marketed, confirming its problems were serious. If it were up to CLIA or the Federal Trade Commission, Ova Check would have been marketed-because they do not have the power to stop it. And we all know how hard it is to get something off the market once it is on. Not to mention the irreparable damage it would have done to women.

To me the arguments that FDA regulation of IVDMIAs will hinder development and commercialization, or that this new regulation is unfair, are non red herrings. Don’t we want to find out which IVDMIAs work and which ones don’t, regardless of when they were developed or by whom? If anything will hold up development in this field it will be the premature marketing of more Ova Checks. As we see this is not just a matter ofj “colorful characters” or fly by night companies as suggested in a recent GAO report. Reputable scientists can make honest mistakes.

As an advocate I think we need to introduce rigor and oversight into the biomarker field and I think the FDA Guidance on IVDMIAs is an important step in that regard. I certainly don’t follow the logic that when IVDMIAs are homebrews they should not be regulated by the FDA. My logic leads in the other direction. All biomarkers, including home brews, when used in the CLINIC should be regulated by the FDA. Otherwise we leave the successful commercialization of IVDMIAs to companies who write the best press release, do the most advertising or try and court advocacy groups.

Posted in Advocacy, Cancer | Tagged: , , , , | Comments Off

Patient Safety Crises in New York State

Posted by medconsumers on December 31, 2006

Center for Medical Consumers
New York Public Interest Research Group

NEWS RELEASE
For immediate release:                                                                        For more information:
Monday, December 22, 2003                                                                 Arthur Levin 212 674-7105
Center for Medical Consumers
Blair Horner 518 436-0876
NYPIRG

REPORT: STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROTECT PATIENTS FROM DANGEROUS DOCS

GROUPS URGE HEVESI TO AUDIT HEALTH DEPARTMENT

PATIENT RIGHTS AND CONSUMER GROUPS URGE REFORMS TO BOOST OVERSIGHT AND IMPROVE DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION

The New York State Health Department is failing to protect patients from dangerous doctors charged patient rights and consumer groups today. The groups documented their concerns in a report that found that the Health Department is taking fewer actions against physicians despite increased resources. The groups urged New York State Comptroller Alan Hevesi to launch an investigation of the Health Department by auditing its unit that oversees physicians.

The key findings of the groups’ report, Failing To Act: New York State’s Department of Health and the Patient Safety Crisis , were:

  • New York State is taking fewer actions against physicians and physicians’ assistants (PAs), despite a doubling of resources, legal reforms and its stated goal of reducing medical injuries.
  • Of that shrinking percentage, few physicians and PAs are disciplined for reasons having to do with their competency to deliver safe and quality medical care.
  • A substantial proportion of OPMC sanctions are based the results of discipline meted out in other jurisdictions. The percentage of sanctions based on investigations originally initiated by OPMC in New York is declining.
  • A large percentage of sanctions imposed by OPMC permit physicians and PAs to continue to practice without interruption in New York State and without notification to their patients.

In addition to calling on Comptroller Hevesi to audit the OPMC, the groups recommended that the state should:

  • Disclose more information to the public about hospitals’ and physicians’ comparative safety and quality performance.
  • Require physicians to routinely demonstrate their medical skills and knowledge as a condition of continued licensure.
  • Mandate that OPMC proactively review physicians’ malpractice experience and initiate investigations as appropriate.
  • Codify the ethical requirement that health care providers and professionals inform patients or patient’s family or friends when a medical errors causing harm has occurred.
  • Require that serious patient harm occurring as a result of office-based surgery be reported to the Health Department.
  • Create an OPMC consumer assistance office to help consumers understand when a complaint is appropriate for OPMC, if not where else to seek redress, and to shepherd them through the process, including advising them about the progress of the complaint.
  • Open up The Board of Professional Medical Conduct to increased public membership, include public members in leadership positions, and permit hearing and appeals panels in some cases, to consist of a majority of public members.
  • Punish physicians and providers who don’t report observed medical misconduct as is required by law.

For complete text of report click here.

Posted in Advocacy, hospitals, malpractice | Tagged: , , | Comments Off

Empty Promises

Posted by medconsumers on December 31, 2005

The Failure of the New York State Health Department to Monitor Medical Errors / New York State’s Failure to Adequately Protect Patients
By: Blair Horner, Arthur Levin. MPH, Rachel Marx

Endorsed by: Center for Justice & Democracy, Center for Medical Consumers, New York Public Interest Research Group, New York StateWide Senior Action Council, Patient Information Alliance, PULSE of New York

It has been a little over five years since the release of the National
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine’s (IoM) landmark report, To Err is Human. Authored by a prestigious group of national experts in patient safety and quality improvement, the report documented for the first time the staggering number of medical errors occurring in the nation’s hospitals. The IoM estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die each year in U.S. hospitals as a result of medical errors, many of which are preventable. The report also stated that the nation spends as much as $29 billion in treating those injured by medical mistakes.

Read entire report.

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Perils of Speedy Drug Approval

Posted by medconsumers on December 1, 2005

I was invited to speak at a November FDA meeting about the upcoming 2007 re-authorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act. Initially passed in 1992, PDUFA allows the FDA to collect a user fee from any  drug company that submits a New Drug Application. In exchange, the FDA agrees to complete its review of the drug company’s clinical trials proving safety and efficacy within six months for priority drugs. And within a year for all others. What follows is a summary of my remarks.

  • In 2004, most of the money for new drug reviews came from industry. Its growing role as the major source of funds for FDA reviews creates a potential conflict of interest that is likely to erode, if it hasn’t already, the public’s trust in both the FDA’s independence and the safety of new drugs.
  • PDUFA has clearly enabled the FDA to complete the review of new drug applications more quickly. Almost all reviews are completed within the specified time limits. And the agency reports that more than 1,000 new drugs have been approved since PDUFA. But there is no evidence that either faster review times or access to the 1,000 new drugs, many of which offer no advantage over older drugs, have benefited the public.
  • There has been concern that faster review times may be causing harm by exposing millions of people to new products that are subsequently found unsafe. Vioxx and Bextra are perhaps the best known examples. And 14 other drugs, approved since 1992, have been withdrawn because of serious harm.
  • The FDA asked all the people who addressed the meeting to comment on the successes and failures of PDUFA since 1992 and what should be improved or changed in 2007. But since there is little or no research evidence on which to base such an assessment, that leaves only anecdotes, which is a poor substitute for science when making public policy.
  • Despite the paucity of evidence about the consequences of continuing the user fees, the realities of a strained federal budget and chronic underfunding of the FDA by Congress, mean that user fees are likely to be a necessary evil for the foreseeable future.
  • The FDA’s voluntary MedWatch program that collects reports of adverse drug reactions from doctors and the public is of limited value, even if it were provided with more resources. If PDUFA is reauthorized, it should fund the FDA’s ability to monitor drug safety using 21st century technologies. This includes proactive monitoring of data derived from such large electronic databases as those of the Veteran’s Administration and health plans like Kaiser-Permanente. This would allow the FDA staff to link prescription drug use with medical histories—a critical tool for both uncovering unexpected adverse drug reactions and having enough information to establish cause.
  • If PDUFA is reauthorized, user fees must be increased to a level permitting FDA to hire a sufficient number of trained staffers to monitor adverse reactions after the drugs become available. Money is also needed to beef up FDA’s computer capacity and to enable its top officials to share safety information with other federal health agencies, specifically the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research.
  • Unfortunately, industry funding of drug safety surveillance creates a potential conflict of interest. For that reason, reliance on user fees to pay for enhanced FDA drug safety efforts must be contingent on erecting a firewall between industry and the agency so he who pays the piper cannot call the tune.
  • Congress should mandate the creation of a new Office of Drug Safety that operates independently of the FDA drug approval staff. The new office should be given the authority to order a drug off the market if safety concerns warrant. It must also have the power to take other actions to limit harm such as ordering a drug maker to put warnings about adverse reactions in the product information given to professionals and patients. At present FDA can only negotiate such critical changes in labeling with the maker. In the case of Vioxx, it took almost two years for Merck to agree to include even a mild caution about an increased risk of heart attack and stroke.

Arthur A. Levin, MPH, Center for Medical Consumers ©
December 2005

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Stop Drug Companies from Hiding Negative Results

Posted by medconsumers on July 1, 2005

Why Do We Need A Publicly Funded, Publicly Accessible Database Of Clinical Trials?

The short answer is this: To stop the pharmaceutical and device industries from hiding the results of clinical trials that did not show a benefit to their products. And to stop them from withholding findings that indicate significant harms associated with their products.

In a perfect world, an independent group of researchers would conduct the clinical trials designed to see whether a new drug is safer or more effective than the drugs already available for the same condition. A head-to-head comparison would be conducted for at least one year. If the new drug has no advantage over the older drugs, it wouldn’t be allowed on the market.

The real world scenario, unfortunately, is far less than perfect. To receive FDA approval, a drug company need only provide two trials that proved its drug is better than nothing (a placebo). Most trials last only a few months. In 2002, Washington Post reporter, Shankar Vedantam , described a new analysis of the trials conducted by drug companies that made drugs to treat depression, such as Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft. The majority of these trials found that placebos were just as effective as the antidepressants, and in some trials, the placebos worked better. But the public never learned about the trials that found antidepressant were ineffective. The drug companies withheld their existence and submitted the FDA-required two trials that did show a benefit to their drug. The analysis described by the Washington Post reporter also revealed that the makers of Prozac had to conduct five trials to obtain two that were positive, and the makers of Paxil and Zoloft had to conduct even more.

The issue of drug companies withholding negative trial results has slowly become more acute in the last 15 years because government funding of trials has decreased considerably. The majority of all drug trials are now conducted by the sponsoring drug companies. And it is becoming increasingly evident that the drug companies get the results they want. A 2003 review published in the BMJ (British Medical Journal) found that studies sponsored by pharmaceutical companies were far more likely to have outcomes favoring the sponsor than were studies with other sponsors . The problem is not limited to pharmaceutical research. For example, in a 2003 review of all studies that looked at total hip arthroplasty implants, 75% were commercially sponsored, of which 93% reported positive outcomes; whereas independently funded researchers reported good results in only 37% of studies.

This critical issue did not begin to penetrate the public’s consciousness until June 2004, when New York State attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, filed a lawsuit against the British-based pharmaceutical company, GlaxoSmithKline. The pharmaceutical company, one of the world’s largest, was accused of “persistent fraud” for failing to tell doctors that some of its studies of the antidepressant Paxil showed that the drug didn’t work in adolescents and might lead to suicidal thoughts. The lawsuit has since been settled.

For more than a decade, a small group of medical journal editors and researchers has periodically offered a solution that has only now gained serious attention: All clinical trials should be registered at the onset. And the registry must be publicly available. Only then will doctors and the public have complete information about all the research that has been conducted on a particular drug or device. Predictably, there is a great deal of resistance to this idea from industry. Congress is considering legislation, entitled Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, which will mandate the early registration of clinical trials. Unfortunately, there are many problems with this proposed legislation, not the least of which is the failure to include more than drug trials in the mandate.

Some journal editors have taken a strong stand on this issue. Last year, a new policy was announced by 11 editors of the world’s most prestigious journals, including the New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, Canadian Medical Association Journal, and the New Zealand Medical Journal. They will not publish results of any trial that has not been registered in a publicly available database before the first participant is enrolled. The policy is aimed at foiling researchers who change the goals of a study while it is in progress and to stop drug companies from withholding the existence of trials that show negative results.

In May 2005, the 11 editors, now called the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, updated its policy about the registration of clinical trials. The journals represented by this committee will not publish trials that are not publicly registered by July 1, 2005. The editors have given the drug companies until September 13, 2005 to register ongoing trials. Other editors from other medical journals have now joined the committee. The policy will be successful only when all medical journals take a similar stand.

The Committee defined clinical trial this way: “Any research project that prospectively assigns human subjects to intervention and comparison groups to study the cause-and-effect relationship between a medical intervention and a health outcome. By ‘medical intervention’ we mean any intervention used to modify a health outcome. This definition includes drugs, surgical procedures, devices, behavioral treatments, process-of-care changes, and the like.”

Consumers have a major stake in this issue. We cannot make informed medical decisions if we cannot trust the research. And clinical trials cannot be conducted without us. People who agree to participate in trial do so with the hope of helping themselves or future patients. To participate in a trial that never is made public means that people have risked the harm of the treatment to no benefit.

The Center for Medical Consumers recommends that people refuse to take part in any clinical trial that is not registered before recruitment. At present, the nearest thing to a publicly available registry is www.clinicaltrials.gov This Web site lists government-sponsored trials; it has been criticized for having incomplete information. Some pharmaceutical companies have begun to list their clinical trials on their respective Web sites.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers ©
July 2005

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Our View of the FDA Hearings on Vioxx, Bextra and Celebrex Safety

Posted by medconsumers on April 1, 2005

A Consumer Advocate at the FDA

February saw an unprecedented three-day FDA advisory committee meeting of outside experts called to consider the fate of the blockbuster arthritis drugs, Vioxx, Celebrex and Bextra. Vioxx was suddenly withdrawn by its maker Merck last September because it was found to increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. Although similar concerns about Celebrex and Bextra were confirmed in studies published early in 2005, their maker, Pfizer, decided not to withdraw the drugs.

Despite the growing evidence of life-threatening adverse reactions, a majority of the combined Arthritis Drug and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees (I am a member of the latter) advised the FDA that all three brands were safe enough to remain on the market. Perhaps the most unexpected outcome was the committee’s vote (17 to 15) for the return of Vioxx. The group voted to keep Bextra on the market by almost as slim a margin. But Celebrex received a resounding 31 votes in favor of continued availability. I cast the lone vote against that drug remaining on the market.

My vote against Celebrex (as well as Bextra and Vioxx) was based on my conclusion from the available evidence that the increased risk of heart attack and stroke was probably a class effect* – meaning that any drug whose action is similar to Vioxx was likely to present similar risks. This was confirmed, by the way, in our discussions by many of my fellow panel members. I thought the committee’s vote bordered on the irrational given the general agreement that serious cardiovascular risks could be expected with all three drugs.

The committee members were obviously impressed by the emotional power of the patient anecdotes– more than 40 patients testified that one or another of the three drugs were the only treatment that brought relief. And, the rheumatologists on the committee for the most part argued (using anecdotal experience as well) that these drugs should remain available because they worked in some patients when all else failed. But, in fact, there is no scientific evidence that Vioxx, Celebrex or Bextra are any more effective in relieving pain than the older drugs taken for arthritis pain.

Perhaps more ominous than the fact that the anecdotes apparently trumped science in the voting, was the revelation after the meeting that a third of the advisory committee members had troubling conflicts of interest. This raised the specter that financial ties to industry, especially Merck and Pfizer, might have influenced the committee’s votes on Bextra and Vioxx.

Prior to the meeting, the newly appointed Secretary of Health & Human Services, Michael Leavitt , and the FDA Commissioner-nominee, Dr. Lester Crawford, assured the public that the agency would be more transparent in the future. Yet the FDA knowingly included scientists and physicians with direct conflicts of interest in the February advisory committee process. And, adding insult to injury, the FDA chose to forgo publically identifying the conflicted committee members. Normally the agency presents a conflict of interest statement at the start of each advisory committee session which identifies conflicted members. The statement also specifies the nature of their conflict, including the dollars involved, and declares whether the member has been granted a waiver to participate or has been recused . For this meeting, the agency inexplicably concluded that, because the discussion was not about a drug approval, such transparency was unnecessary.

Congress continues to draft legislation to deal with FDA’s shortcomings. What is needed is real reform – not marginal changes that are more scenic than substantive. The Center for Medical Consumers, working with other national consumer and patient advocacy organizations, is trying to make sure that whatever legislation is passed will meaningfully improve the ability of the FDA to protect the public from harm. To be effective, Congress must provide more money and grant more legal authority for the FDA to monitor and enforce drug safety. Congress should also insist that the agency’s decision-making be completely transparent to the public it serves.

* Older arthritis drugs, such as ibuprofen and naproxen, are not included in this class because they have a somewhat different action.

Arthur A. Levin, MPH, Center for Medical Consumers ©, April 2005.

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Integrity in Science

Posted by medconsumers on September 1, 2003

Conference Addresses Corporate Influences on Medical Research

By Maryann Napoli
(September 2003)

The American public is concerned about the fact that many physicians and scientists have financial ties to the drug and device industries, and most people want the news media to do a better job disclosing these ties whenever experts are quoted. These results, from a survey conducted by the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), led this advocacy group to convene a recent conference in Washington, DC, entitled, “Conflicted Science: Corporate Influence on Scientific Research and Science-Based Policy.” The speakers were primarily researchers and investigative journalists who have written articles about this topic, which has become the focus of mounting concern for editors of medical journals.

Michael Jacobson, CSPI’s executive director, set the tone for the conference: “The corporate world seeks to influence science and science policy at many different levels, from the sponsorship and design of university research to the creation of scientific journals; from placing sympathetic scientists on federal and international advisory committees to generating publicity in the mass media; from influencing major health charities to creating their own friendly nonprofit organizations.” As he turned the program over to the speakers, Jacobson said that he had asked them not only to express their concerns, but also to suggest remedies.

Passive smoking is one major area followed by Lisa A. Bero, PhD, Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco. “Researchers funded by the tobacco industry were nine times more likely to find no relationship between ill health and passive smoking,” she found. When a 1981 study showed a link between lung disease and non-smoking women living with smokers, Dr. Bero said that the tobacco industry created its own study to refute it. For example, the industry funded studies found ill effects of other sources of indoor air pollution to distract from the importance of secondhand smoke, reported Dr. Bero. Another common tactic was to create doubt in the media about the studies that showed adverse health effects associated with smoking and to characterize such findings as “controversial.”

Drummond Rennie, MD, deputy editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, pointed out that drug companies often set up comparison trials designed in such a way that their products are bound to come out on top. He gave as example the clinical trial Pfizer designed for its oral drug fluconazole (Diflucan), which treats yeast infections and toenail fungus. To prove that fluconazole is best at treating the potentially fatal funguses that afflict people with AIDS, Pfizer tested its drug against oral versions of competitors’ antifungal drugs-one of which should have been given only intravenously and the other already known to be ineffective in people with AIDS.

Secretiveness is also a major problem. To the drug industry, “everything is a trade secret, even the very existence of a clinical trial,” Dr. Rennie said, referring to the fact that industry-sponsored trials that produce negative results often go unpublished. The remedy for this problem, he said, would be the required registration of all trials at inception. That way a drug company cannot hide the number of trials that come up with results unfavorable to their products. As for the common problem of university researchers with financial ties to industry, Dr. Rennie noted, wryly, “What is called conflict of interest is called synergy by Wall Street.”

Dr. Rennie alluded to two high-profile cases in which researchers found that the cheaper, older drug was not only more effective, but also safer than newer products. In both cases, the drug companies whose products were in danger of losing market share attacked the researchers’ credibility and initiated lawsuits to stop them from going public with the results.

Two weight loss drugs sold in the combination called “fen-phen” made news in the 1990s because they caused heart valve damage. Investigative reporter Alicia Mundy, who wrote a book on the topic, told the conference how much she learned about the use of medical studies as public relation tools while searching the files of Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories. Her book Dispensing With the Truth “documents how this drug company and its partners knew about the diet drugs’ links to an increasing number of deaths from a lung disease and to major heart valve damage, and did not reveal this to doctors, to the press, or to the FDA.” About 7 million people took the drugs from 1994 to 1997.

After the diet drugs Redux and Pondimin (the “fen” of the “fen-phen” combination) were withdrawn in 1997 at the urging of the FDA, the manufacturers put their considerable resources toward damage control. A 1998 front-page story in USA Today proclaimed, “Study: No heart damage from diet drug.” The source of the headline was a study presented by Dr. Neil Weissman at an American College of Cardiology conference, and the upbeat news was also reported in The New York Times. Mundy said that her investigative work led her to this scoop: After the conference, Dr. Weissman sent his study to The New England Journal of Medicine, which provisionally rejected it. Mundy found that the Journal editor had sent a letter to Dr. Weissman, telling him to recalculate his results using a methodology suggested by the Journal’s reviewers.

Once Dr. Weissman complied, Mundy said, his results were quite different. A significant link was shown between heart-valve damage and the drug Redux. Two other studies eventually found the same link, but when the recalculated study was eventually published by The New England Journal, the revised findings never got the same media attention. “No one noticed,” observed Mundy, that the lead researcher was the same Weissman who, only six months earlier, had dismissed the heart-valve problems.

“We don’t hear much about the fen-phen story anymore,” noted Mundy, explaining the reason. The people who brought lawsuits against Wyeth-Ayerst because they had been harmed by these diet drugs had to sign confidentiality agreements that prevent them from warning others.

One common way drug companies can easily get free air time for their sales pitches is the video news release (VNR), which is an ad disguised as objective reporting. TV stations love these VNRs because they save them money and feed the desire for news with a positive spin, according to Trudy Lieberman, a journalist and director of the Center for Consumer Health Choices at Consumers Union. She tracked the Cytyc Corporation’s VNRs for its new Pap test technology called ThinPrep. “It followed the standard VNR formula,” explained Lieberman, “It is patient-based, always positive and always provides a take-away message: have this test, buy this product, ask your doctor.”

Lieberman encountered the same “patient” in dozens of stories in print and TV. Her name is Peggy Smith, and she tells women that ThinPrep had saved her life. What harm do these disguised ads cause, asked Lieberman, rhetorically. “There is no evidence that this technology saves lives, though ThinPrep does generate a lot of false-positive results and unnecessary investigations,” she said, “And the people viewing these VNRs probably do not have a clue that they are ads.”

Of the remedies suggested by the speakers, full disclosure was on everyone’s list. One can’t help but notice, however, that the media are currently doing an uneven job in this regard. For example, last November, The New England Journal of Medicine published a major study that found testing people for C-reactive protein might be more useful in determining heart disease risk than cholesterol screening. The media were filled with upbeat quotes about the importance of C-reactive protein testing from the lead author, Paul M. Ridker, MD. However, virtually all the news stories left out the information that Dr. Ridker holds a patent on the new test, a fact disclosed in small print at the end of his study in The New England Journal of Medicine.

On the other hand, some journalists are doing their jobs. When the National Cholesterol Education Program revised their guidelines in 2001 by lowering the level at which people were considered to have dangerously high cholesterol, Thomas Burton and Chris Adams of The Wall Street Journal noted that 36 million people now had high cholesterol which automatically triples the number of Americans who are candidates for cholesterol-lowering drugs. Burton and Adams also noted that five of the 14 members of the committee that made this decision were either consultants to, or had received honorariums from, companies that made cholesterol-lowering drugs.

Though people often view non-profit health organizations as objective, many take industry funding that could compromise their advice to the public. To let consumers and journalists know who takes money from whom, the conference sponsor, Center for Science in the Public Interest, or CSPI, has compiled a long list of non-profit professional organizations and charities with ties to industry. For example, the American Heart Association accepted $400,000 from Merck, makers of a top-selling cholesterol-lowering drug, to teach 40,000 doctors to treat cholesterol according to guidelines.

For a copy of “Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Corporate Support for Health and Environmental Professional Associations, Charities, and Industry Front Groups,” send a $15 check to CSPI, 1875 Connecticut Ave., Ste 300, Washington, DC 20009-5728. Attn: Adam Pearson.

For a copy of “Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Corporate Support for Health and Environmental Professional Associations, Charities, and Industry Front Groups,” send a $15 check to CSPI, 1875 Connecticut Ave., Ste 300, Washington, DC 20009-5728. Attn: Adam Pearson.

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Accurately Written Prescription Drug Information

Posted by medconsumers on July 31, 2003

FDA Should Require Accurate Written Prescription Drug Information For Consumers

The following comments were presented at an FDA meeting in Washington DC on July 31, 2003, and formally submitted to the FDA docket.

The Current Status of the Private Sector’s Efforts to Provide Useful Written Prescription Drug Information to Consumers
(Docket No. 03N-0168)

Submitted By: Arthur A. Levin, MPH, Director
The Center for Medical Consumers

Thank you for the opportunity to present my comments today on this important consumer protection issue. I am responding to the FDA’s request for comment in my capacity as Director of the Center for Medical Consumers, a non-profit consumer advocacy organization located in New York City.

In the spirit of full disclosure I would like to state for the record that the Center is a 501c3 not for profit organization and does not receive any grants from the health care industry, including any manufacturer of drugs, devices, biologics or medical equipment. You should also know that I served as a member of the congressionally established Steering Committee for the Collaborative Development of a Long-Range Action Plan for the Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information that issued its report to HHS in December 1996. And, I am currently the consumer member of the FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DSaRM).

Since it’s founding in 1976, the Center has advocated on behalf of the rights of consumers and patients to know everything there is to know about a prescription drug or medical device. I believe that open access to this information is critical to patient safety, and a necessary condition of informed decision-making and informed consent. And I would suggest that the demonstrated decades of failure of the various private sector interests to provide high quality written prescription drug information to consumers should be a matter of urgent concern from what is after all, a public health agency.

People define the goals of providing consumers and patients with written information about their prescription drugs from different perspectives. Some see it as a means to improve patient “compliance” with drug regimens, others as a way to encourage people to take the drugs prescribed to them and still other as a means of educating people about proper use. I have a different set of priorities in mind. The first is that of protecting consumers from the risks inherent in prescription drugs; second, providing the means by which a patient can give informed consent to taking a drug in the first place and third is optimizing the benefits of the medication.

The FDA asked that public comment address four questions that were posed in the Federal Register notice of this meeting. The first two are really more appropriate for an industry response – so I will comment only on the last two.

What should the role of the FDA be in assuring full implementation of the Action Plan to meet the Year 2006 goal?

To my mind the answer is simple: The FDA should mandate the distribution of “useful” written consumer drug information with all prescriptions and only count as “useful” the written information that conforms to the Action Plan guidelines for content and format. These guidelines represent a set of criteria for judging the “quality” of the information and after development by the Steering Committee were formally accepted by the Secretary of Health & Human Services.

Useful Written Drug Information for Consumers: An Urgent Public Health Priority

In its 2001 report, Crossing the Quality Chasm, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America wrote:

“Health care today harms too frequently and routinely fails to deliver its potential benefits”.

That preventable patient harm from prescription drugs is an urgent public health problem is to my mind beyond question. Consider the following: PharmaTrends, an industry data analyst firm estimates that 3,340,000,000 outpatient prescriptions were written in 2002. That’s an average of 10 prescriptions a year for every woman, man and child in America. That’s also 3, 340,000,000 opportunities for a patient to be injured by a preventable medication error; to be unaware that a drug’s risks may exceed its benefits or not to understand that perhaps they shouldn’t have been prescribed or dispensed a particular drug in the first place.

The evidence of serious harm to patients as a result of medication errors, adverse drug reactions and drug interactions is substantial and growing. Because of this overwhelming evidence it is, I believe, unconscionable for industry and health professional self-interest to be permitted to take precedence over the well-being and safety of patients. But that is exactly what has happened over the past twenty-five years. In my view, the time for government’s continued reliance on a demonstrably failed voluntary, private sector effort is over.

Why is written drug information for consumer so important? Well, for one thing experts have suggested that a meaningful reduction in patient harm could be achieved if consumers and patients were better informed about the drugs they take. In its 1999 report on medical errors, the IOM’s Committee of the Quality of Health Care recommended that:

“A major unused resource in most hospitals, clinics and practices is the patient. Not only do patients have a right to know the medications they are receiving, the reasons for them, their expected effects and possible complications, they should also know what the pills or injections look like and how often they are to receive them.”

Historically, face-to-face prescription drug counseling by doctors and pharmacists has been viewed as the principal means to inform patients. In fact, physicians like to refer to their roles as “the learned intermediary.” Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence suggesting that prescribers and dispensers spend little or no time counseling patients about the prescriptions they take. Also, in our current financially stressed health care system, doctors, nurses and pharmacists complain that they have less and less time to spend with individual patients. And there are some logistical complications; for example a growing number of patients receive their prescriptions at home by mail either from pharmacy benefit managers or because they have been purchased thru the Internet.

There is also good reason to believe that the drug information imparted by prescribers may not necessarily be scientifically accurate, up to date or free of professional or specialty bias. I would also suggest that there is little disagreement that the amount of information flowing from published studies, the National Institutes of Health, specialty society guidelines, protocols, care maps and the like is simply overwhelming. Many experts believe it is humanely impossible for a single clinician to keep up. In others words, your intermediary may not be so “learned.”

It seems unlikely, based on what we know (or don’t know) about changing professional behavior that rapid progress can be made to change professional behavior so that evidence-based prescribing and dispensing is the norm. Also, it would take a revolution in the way health care is currently organized and financed to encourage sufficient time and incentives for doctors, nurses and pharmacists to spend the time necessary to counsel patients and to do so without any bias based on their professional or entrepreneur interests. And lastly, we cannot ignore the pernicious influence of industry’s intense product promotions to doctors and pharmacists in shaping their knowledge base about the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs. Because of these realities, an FDA mandate that prescriptions be accompanied by high quality written consumer drug information is, I respectfully suggest, a critical, absolutely appropriate “safety net” to protect patients from harm.

Thirty-Five Years in the Making and Still Counting:

Today, we have been asked by the agency to once again provide comment and guidance about the provision of written prescription drug information to consumers. We are re-visiting this issue in July 2003 – some 35 years after the FDA first required that labeling written in non-technical language be given to consumers whenever certain prescription drugs or devices were dispensed. I think that to fully understand why we are having this meeting three decades after a written consumer information initiative was first undertaken by the FDA, it is important to have a sense of the history of efforts to provide better consumer information about the risks and benefits of prescription drugs

Tom McGiness has provided us with a short history of the battles over written drug information for consumers. That history tells us that FDA has made several politically frustrated attempts to ensure that quality written drug information is in the hands of consumers when they need it.

Since 1968, despite seemingly broad agreement that providing better information to consumers about their prescription drugs is a laudable, potentially health-enhancing goal, we have witnessed a contentious struggle over how best to accomplish that task, what such information should include and whose responsibility is it to produce, distribute and evaluate the information.

A proposal to mandate broad distribution of PPIs was finalized by the Carter administration in 1979. It was subsequently withdrawn by the FDA after newly elected President Reagan rejected the initiative, which various industries, professional groups and conservatives in Congress saw as a example of government excess, in favor of a “hands off” private sector approach – a bias that has dominated this public policy discussion ever since.

Eight years ago, in what I would characterize as a frank acknowledgment of the failure of the private sector to achieve the desired goals of the 1980 PPI program after some fifteen years of effort, the FDA published a new proposed rule in The Federal Register titled “Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements” [Docket No. 93N-0371].

In the narrative accompanying the proposed rule the FDA noted that:

“During the hearing that led to the withdrawal of the 1980 PPI regulations, promises were made by representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, medical and pharmacy community that if FDA withdrew the PPI regulations, the private sector would develop a variety of systems that would meet the goals of the proposed PPI program. These promises have not yet been fulfilled.”

While the 1995 proposed rule, quickly dubbed “Med Guides,” still looked to the private sector to deliver on its promises, the agency at least recognized the need to establish criteria for what comprised “useful” written information. This important step meant that: (1) there could be uniformity and consistency in the information provided; and (2) there would be assurance that the information provided consumers is scientifically accurate and otherwise “useful” as defined by the FDA. Models for consistent labeling exist in food labels and the newly redesigned OTC drug labeling. Perhaps most important, a set of common criteria provide the tools with which to objectively evaluate the quality of the drug information being published and distributed by the private sector.

In support of the 1995 proposed Med Guide rule, the FDA argued that:

“…improved dissemination of accurate, thorough and understandable information about prescription drug products is necessary to fulfill patients’ need and right to be informed.”

When the FDA convened a two-day meeting to discuss the proposed rule, it was trashed by every professional and industry group, including doctors, information publishers, pharmacy trade associations, pharmacists and others.

The objections of trade and professionals associations ultimately held sway in Congress. The FDA was “banned” implement its Med Guide proposal or any other mandate under Public Law 104-180 enacted in 1996. The law directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to convene the Steering Committee for the Collaborative Development of a Long-Range Action Plan for the Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information. The Steering Committee, with a diverse membership of 34 pharmacy, pharmacist, information publisher, professional and consumer organizations hammered out an Action Plan” for the Secretary in the required 120 days. The Action Plan, somewhat surprisingly, contained content and format criteria that were almost identical to Med Guides and that were accepted by the Secretary.

Private Sector Effort Evaluated in 2001 and Found Wanting:

The FDA, in compliance with the Action Plan and Public Law 104-180 contracted with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) for a national study to assess the usefulness of written information bring distributed to patients. A subcontractor, the University of Wisconsin, Madison School of Pharmacy, conducted a more in-depth evaluation that which relied on professional shoppers to collect the materials and both consumer and expert evaluators to judge the materials based on the criteria recommended in the Action Plan.

I would suggest that despite the somewhat positive tone adopted in FDA’s press releases when the study was released, the results of that evaluation in December 2001, provides strong evidence that more than two decades of private sector efforts have fallen considerably short of the Action Plan’s goals.

Even though I have some reservations about the way in which Action Plan criteria were judged by the expert, the results still to point to serious shortfalls in regard to patient safety. For example Table #3 in the 2001 evaluation reports tells us that for all four drugs studied, the mean level of adherence to Action Plan criteria hovered at about 50%. None achieved the highest level of quality. Now when I went to school decades ago getting 50% on an evaluation was a failing grade. And the self congratulation about the fact that almost 90% of consumers seem to be getting some information is a mixed blessing: half are receiving poor quality information that may actually do more harm that not having any information at all.

The FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DsaRM) met one year ago to consider whether, based on the University of Wisconsin evaluation of written information provided in community pharmacies, the private sector had achieved the Year 2001 goal established by the Action Plan. My position at that meeting was, that based on the results of the evaluation, the voluntary, private sector effort had clearly failed to meet the Action Plan’s 2001 interim goal. I argued that the FDA, under the authority granted by Public Law 104-180, should take appropriate steps to ensure that the Action Plan’s 2006 goal for provision of “useful” written information to consumers would be met. Well as I have already suggested, there is only one responsible action for the FDA – and that is to proactively enforce the Action Plan criteria by mandating that written information, meeting the Action Plan criteria (and at more than a 50% “pass rate”), be dispensed with every prescription.

The fourth question posed by the FDA was:

What other initiatives should FDA consider for providing patients with useful written information about prescription drugs?

Isn’t it time to move to consider a broad move to unit of use packaging? I can only guess why has it, while embraced in Europe, has been so strongly resisted in the U.S. healthcare system

I would argue that unit of use packaging presents real opportunities for improving patient safety related to written information, as well as in other ways. For example, moving to unit of use packaging would allow FDA to mandate that drug manufacturers be the responsible party for the provision of “useful” written consumer information since they would have to incorporate with the unit of use package provided to dispensers. Written information could be evaluated prior to new drug or indication approval so that we get information to consumers, which is as close to 100% compliant with Action Plan criteria as humanely possible. Unit of use packaging incorporating written consumer information eliminates any distribution failures; it allows standardization of the content and format of information and the information stays with the packaging, and thus the patient, for the full course of the treatment. And of course, unit of use packaging provides other safety benefits, such as making it easy to recognize a missed dose.

Note: In 1998 the FDA was given the OK to require drug makers supply Medication Guides with certain highly problematic drugs. To date, less than two-dozen such guides have been required, including ones for the drugs Accutane (isotretinoin), Lotronex (alosetron), Nolvadex (tamoxifen) and Mifeprex (mifepristone) and all forms of the biologic interferon.

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Letter To FDA Opposing Use of Surrogate Endpoints for Approval of Cancer Prevention Drugs

Posted by medconsumers on June 26, 2003

This letter was mailed to the FDA commissioner on June 26, 2003. It is an open letter that went to various medical reporters.

June 26, 2003

Dear Dr. McClellan:

The undersigned consumer advocacy organizations write to express our alarm at the behind-the-scenes efforts by Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach and Dr. Anna Barker to undermine the FDA’s drug approval requirements.(1) Their proposal to use surrogate endpoints for the approval of cancer chemoprevention drugs should be rejected by the FDA.

Because these potentially harmful drugs will be given to healthy people, it is all the more imperative that the FDA not relax its approval standards. In fact, manufacturers of chemoprevention agents should be required to prove that their drugs reduce cancer-specific mortality as well as all-cause mortality. The need to address all-cause mortality for drugs given to healthy people is best illustrated by the first 20 years of cholesterol research. Randomized controlled trials showed that the reduced rate of cardiovascular mortality in healthy but high-risk men given cholesterol-lowering drugs was offset by a higher rate of overall mortality. (2)

There are many examples of surrogate endpoints that eventually proved to be wrong. Because postmenopausal hormones could reduce cholesterol, this was thought to be a good surrogate for heart disease prevention-until the Women’s Health Initiative showed they caused more cardiovascular events.(3) The validity of surrogate endpoints-even for cancer treatment drugs-has been controversial for over 15 years.(3) That controversy will only be exacerbated in the context of a drug for the treatment of non-invasive lesions and “precancers,” given the fact that so many resolve spontaneously or remain dormant..(4)

There is much to be learned from the 1998 approval of tamoxifen for “prevention,” once the drug halved the breast cancer incidence in the P-1 Trial. Now, women are justifiably concerned about the safety of taking an anti-cancer drug with potentially fatal side effects simply because a doctor deemed them high risk. (5) Several of the undersigned pointed out to the FDA’s Oncologic Drug Advisory Committee that the P-1 Trial’s failure to prove tamoxifen can reduce breast cancer mortality left the lingering question of whether the drug merely delays the onset of breast cancer.

It is shocking to learn that federal employees-particularly two who head the NCI-are meeting behind closed doors with a representative of the drug industry to influence drug approval policy and to change the product liability laws. Any change in the product liability laws will almost certainly have long-lasting implications in many arenas. We look to the FDA to take the proper steps to follow its mandate and protect the public’s interest.

Sincerely,

Maryann Napoli
Center for Medical Consumers
Judy Norsigian
Boston Womens Health Collective

Barbara Brenner
Breast Cancer Action, San Francisco

Sharon Batt
Women and Health Protection, Canada

Deborah Forter
Massachusetts Breast Cancer Coalition
Cindy Pearson
National Women’s Health Network

_____________________________

(1) Goldberg, P. NCI Deputy Barker Hits FDA, Calls for New Incentives for Pharmaceutical Industry. The Cancer Letter, May 30, 2003.
(2) Moore Thomas J. Heart Failure. New York: Touchtone Books/Simon & Schuster, 1989
(3)Rossouw JE et al. Risks and benefits of estrogen plus progestin in healthy postmenopausal women: principal results from the Women’s Health Initiative randomized controlled trial. JAMA 2002;288:321-33.
(4) Raffle AE et al. Detection rates for abnormal cervical smears: what are we screening for? Lancet 1995;345:1469-73
(5) Port ER et al. Patient reluctance toward tamoxifen use for breast cancer primary prevention. Ann Surg Oncol 2001:8:580-5.

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