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Posts Tagged ‘FDA’

Stop Drug Companies from Hiding Negative Results

Posted by medconsumers on July 1, 2005

Why Do We Need A Publicly Funded, Publicly Accessible Database Of Clinical Trials?

The short answer is this: To stop the pharmaceutical and device industries from hiding the results of clinical trials that did not show a benefit to their products. And to stop them from withholding findings that indicate significant harms associated with their products.

In a perfect world, an independent group of researchers would conduct the clinical trials designed to see whether a new drug is safer or more effective than the drugs already available for the same condition. A head-to-head comparison would be conducted for at least one year. If the new drug has no advantage over the older drugs, it wouldn’t be allowed on the market.

The real world scenario, unfortunately, is far less than perfect. To receive FDA approval, a drug company need only provide two trials that proved its drug is better than nothing (a placebo). Most trials last only a few months. In 2002, Washington Post reporter, Shankar Vedantam , described a new analysis of the trials conducted by drug companies that made drugs to treat depression, such as Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft. The majority of these trials found that placebos were just as effective as the antidepressants, and in some trials, the placebos worked better. But the public never learned about the trials that found antidepressant were ineffective. The drug companies withheld their existence and submitted the FDA-required two trials that did show a benefit to their drug. The analysis described by the Washington Post reporter also revealed that the makers of Prozac had to conduct five trials to obtain two that were positive, and the makers of Paxil and Zoloft had to conduct even more.

The issue of drug companies withholding negative trial results has slowly become more acute in the last 15 years because government funding of trials has decreased considerably. The majority of all drug trials are now conducted by the sponsoring drug companies. And it is becoming increasingly evident that the drug companies get the results they want. A 2003 review published in the BMJ (British Medical Journal) found that studies sponsored by pharmaceutical companies were far more likely to have outcomes favoring the sponsor than were studies with other sponsors . The problem is not limited to pharmaceutical research. For example, in a 2003 review of all studies that looked at total hip arthroplasty implants, 75% were commercially sponsored, of which 93% reported positive outcomes; whereas independently funded researchers reported good results in only 37% of studies.

This critical issue did not begin to penetrate the public’s consciousness until June 2004, when New York State attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, filed a lawsuit against the British-based pharmaceutical company, GlaxoSmithKline. The pharmaceutical company, one of the world’s largest, was accused of “persistent fraud” for failing to tell doctors that some of its studies of the antidepressant Paxil showed that the drug didn’t work in adolescents and might lead to suicidal thoughts. The lawsuit has since been settled.

For more than a decade, a small group of medical journal editors and researchers has periodically offered a solution that has only now gained serious attention: All clinical trials should be registered at the onset. And the registry must be publicly available. Only then will doctors and the public have complete information about all the research that has been conducted on a particular drug or device. Predictably, there is a great deal of resistance to this idea from industry. Congress is considering legislation, entitled Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, which will mandate the early registration of clinical trials. Unfortunately, there are many problems with this proposed legislation, not the least of which is the failure to include more than drug trials in the mandate.

Some journal editors have taken a strong stand on this issue. Last year, a new policy was announced by 11 editors of the world’s most prestigious journals, including the New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, Canadian Medical Association Journal, and the New Zealand Medical Journal. They will not publish results of any trial that has not been registered in a publicly available database before the first participant is enrolled. The policy is aimed at foiling researchers who change the goals of a study while it is in progress and to stop drug companies from withholding the existence of trials that show negative results.

In May 2005, the 11 editors, now called the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, updated its policy about the registration of clinical trials. The journals represented by this committee will not publish trials that are not publicly registered by July 1, 2005. The editors have given the drug companies until September 13, 2005 to register ongoing trials. Other editors from other medical journals have now joined the committee. The policy will be successful only when all medical journals take a similar stand.

The Committee defined clinical trial this way: “Any research project that prospectively assigns human subjects to intervention and comparison groups to study the cause-and-effect relationship between a medical intervention and a health outcome. By ‘medical intervention’ we mean any intervention used to modify a health outcome. This definition includes drugs, surgical procedures, devices, behavioral treatments, process-of-care changes, and the like.”

Consumers have a major stake in this issue. We cannot make informed medical decisions if we cannot trust the research. And clinical trials cannot be conducted without us. People who agree to participate in trial do so with the hope of helping themselves or future patients. To participate in a trial that never is made public means that people have risked the harm of the treatment to no benefit.

The Center for Medical Consumers recommends that people refuse to take part in any clinical trial that is not registered before recruitment. At present, the nearest thing to a publicly available registry is www.clinicaltrials.gov This Web site lists government-sponsored trials; it has been criticized for having incomplete information. Some pharmaceutical companies have begun to list their clinical trials on their respective Web sites.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers ©
July 2005

Posted in Advocacy, Conflict of Interest | Tagged: , , , | Comments Off

Former Medical Journal Editor Speaks Out About Conflicts Of Interest

Posted by medconsumers on June 1, 2005

The pharmaceutical industry’s corrupting influence on our medical care system usually gets the most attention. Now its corrupting influence on medical journals has come under fire. Yes they’re full of drug ads that prompt the usual suspicions about financial dependency. But that’s the least of it, according to Richard Smith, MD, who resigned last year as editor-in-chief of the BMJ (British Medical Journal).

In a recent commentary for the Public Library of Science, a free online medical journal, Dr. Smith identified the less obvious conflicts of interest that surround the most respected form of research, the randomized clinical trial. Whenever a large trial is published in a high-profile journal, it has that journal’s implicit stamp of approval and may well receive global media coverage thanks to drug company-financed PR.   A trial with favorable results will generate far more money for the drug companies than a multi-page advertising campaign, according to Dr. Smith, and that’s why they spend “upwards of a million dollars” on reprints of the trial to send around the world. Doctors won’t necessarily read the reprints, he acknowledges, but the name of a highly respected medical journal will impress them.

Here’s the most disturbing element of this scenario: More and more drug companies are getting the results they want because the trials are often rigged. Most drug trials are now sponsored by the drug companies. They can, and often do, design a trial in such a way as to get results that prove a drug’s benefit. In fact, several reviews have already found that most of the industry-funded trials have findings that favor the drug. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of trials published in the major journals—Annals of Internal Medicine, JAMA, Lancet, New England Journal of Medicine—are funded by drug companies.

To get FDA approval, a company need only prove its drug is better than nothing (a placebo). But even more profits can be made in that relatively uncommon instance when a drug company compares its newer drug against a competitor’s older less expensive drug. The trials can be rigged in a variety of ways, according to Dr. Smith. The comparator drug is purposely given in a weak dose so the sponsoring company’s drug will appear more effective. Or, the drug will be compared against a treatment already known to be inferior. Another common technique is designing a trial with multiple endpoints, or goals, such as reductions in stroke, hospitalizations, and then select for publication only those that favored the drug.

How to Misrepresent with Statistics

What’s more, medical journals allow trial results to be published in relative risk reduction terms, which make the drug appear more effective than it truly is. A classic example: The top-selling cholesterol-lowering drugs called statins will reduce the risk of having a heart attack by 25%. Would you be inclined to take the drug if the same results were expressed this way? The heart attack rate in the placebo group was 4% and the rate in the statin group was 3%. (The 25% is the difference between the two groups.) Worse, the drug companies often provide journals with incomplete data from their trials regarding drug-related harms.

Some journal editors are fighting back. Last year, a new policy was announced by 11 editors of the world’s most prestigious journals, including the New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, and Canadian Medical Association Journal. They will not publish results of any trial that has not been registered in a publicly available database before the first participant is enrolled. The policy is aimed at foiling researchers who change the goals of a study while it’s in progress and to stop drug companies from withholding the existence of trials that show negative results.

The likelihood of trial results favoring the trial’s sponsor is not limited to pharmaceutical research. In a 2003 review of all studies that looked at total hip arthroplasty implants, 75% were commercially sponsored, of which 93% reported positive outcomes; whereas independently funded researchers reported good results in only 37% of the studies.

Dr. Smith calls for more public funding of trials that do head-to-head comparisons of all available treatments for the same condition–that would leave journals to concentrate on critically assessing the trials. He is now chief executive for the European division of UnitedHealth Group, the largest health insurance company in the U.S. , and a board member of   the PLoS Medicine journal.

It remains to be seen whether all medical journals will follow the lead of the 11 that called for the registration of all trials. Success is dependent upon participation of all journals.   How carefully will medical journal editors scrutinize a major trial likely to generate worldwide media attention if their own financial well-being is at stake? When the sale of reprints can have a profit margin of 70%, writes Dr. Smith, “an editor may … face a frighteningly stark conflict of interest: publish a trial that will bring in $100,000 of profit or meet the end-of-the-year budget by firing an editor.”

Dr. Smith reports that it took him a quarter of a century editing for the BMJ to wake up to the fact that he was being manipulated. ±

More About the Public Library of Science ( PLoS ) Medicine

When this free online medical journal published its first issue at the end of last year, Dr. Smith noted, “The launch of PLoS Medicine provides an opportunity to reinvent medical journals. Publishers have made money by restricting access to research and limiting the development of new ideas. And I hope that free access to research will encourage greater public understanding of science. It will certainly be a boon for patients, many of whom are even more eager than doctors to access the latest research.”   Go to www.plosjournals.org

More About the Registration of Clinical Trials

Last month, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors updated its policy about the registration of clinical trials. The journals represented by this committee will not publish trials that are not publicly registered by July 1, 2005. The editors have given the drug companies until September 13, 2005 to register ongoing trials. Other journal editors have now joined the committee.

Congress is considering legislation, entitled Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, which will mandate the early registration of clinical trials.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers ©
June 2005

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Our View of the FDA Hearings on Vioxx, Bextra and Celebrex Safety

Posted by medconsumers on April 1, 2005

A Consumer Advocate at the FDA

February saw an unprecedented three-day FDA advisory committee meeting of outside experts called to consider the fate of the blockbuster arthritis drugs, Vioxx, Celebrex and Bextra. Vioxx was suddenly withdrawn by its maker Merck last September because it was found to increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. Although similar concerns about Celebrex and Bextra were confirmed in studies published early in 2005, their maker, Pfizer, decided not to withdraw the drugs.

Despite the growing evidence of life-threatening adverse reactions, a majority of the combined Arthritis Drug and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees (I am a member of the latter) advised the FDA that all three brands were safe enough to remain on the market. Perhaps the most unexpected outcome was the committee’s vote (17 to 15) for the return of Vioxx. The group voted to keep Bextra on the market by almost as slim a margin. But Celebrex received a resounding 31 votes in favor of continued availability. I cast the lone vote against that drug remaining on the market.

My vote against Celebrex (as well as Bextra and Vioxx) was based on my conclusion from the available evidence that the increased risk of heart attack and stroke was probably a class effect* – meaning that any drug whose action is similar to Vioxx was likely to present similar risks. This was confirmed, by the way, in our discussions by many of my fellow panel members. I thought the committee’s vote bordered on the irrational given the general agreement that serious cardiovascular risks could be expected with all three drugs.

The committee members were obviously impressed by the emotional power of the patient anecdotes– more than 40 patients testified that one or another of the three drugs were the only treatment that brought relief. And, the rheumatologists on the committee for the most part argued (using anecdotal experience as well) that these drugs should remain available because they worked in some patients when all else failed. But, in fact, there is no scientific evidence that Vioxx, Celebrex or Bextra are any more effective in relieving pain than the older drugs taken for arthritis pain.

Perhaps more ominous than the fact that the anecdotes apparently trumped science in the voting, was the revelation after the meeting that a third of the advisory committee members had troubling conflicts of interest. This raised the specter that financial ties to industry, especially Merck and Pfizer, might have influenced the committee’s votes on Bextra and Vioxx.

Prior to the meeting, the newly appointed Secretary of Health & Human Services, Michael Leavitt , and the FDA Commissioner-nominee, Dr. Lester Crawford, assured the public that the agency would be more transparent in the future. Yet the FDA knowingly included scientists and physicians with direct conflicts of interest in the February advisory committee process. And, adding insult to injury, the FDA chose to forgo publically identifying the conflicted committee members. Normally the agency presents a conflict of interest statement at the start of each advisory committee session which identifies conflicted members. The statement also specifies the nature of their conflict, including the dollars involved, and declares whether the member has been granted a waiver to participate or has been recused . For this meeting, the agency inexplicably concluded that, because the discussion was not about a drug approval, such transparency was unnecessary.

Congress continues to draft legislation to deal with FDA’s shortcomings. What is needed is real reform – not marginal changes that are more scenic than substantive. The Center for Medical Consumers, working with other national consumer and patient advocacy organizations, is trying to make sure that whatever legislation is passed will meaningfully improve the ability of the FDA to protect the public from harm. To be effective, Congress must provide more money and grant more legal authority for the FDA to monitor and enforce drug safety. Congress should also insist that the agency’s decision-making be completely transparent to the public it serves.

* Older arthritis drugs, such as ibuprofen and naproxen, are not included in this class because they have a somewhat different action.

Arthur A. Levin, MPH, Center for Medical Consumers ©, April 2005.

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Radiation Risks Of Full-Body Scans

Posted by medconsumers on October 1, 2004

Full-body scans have been heavily promoted to the public as a means of finding cancer before symptoms appear, but a new report suggests that the radiation doses delivered by these tests are high enough to cause cancer. In last month’s issue of the journal Radiology, David J. Brenner, PhD, and Carl D. Elliston, MA, provided the following lifetime estimates of the risks associated with having one or repeated full-body scans.

“If a 45-year old adult has one screening full-body scan, then many years down the line, one in 1,200 will die from a radiation-induced cancer,” explained Dr. Brenner, in a telephone interview. He noted that this risk is obviously low, but the promotion of these full-body scans as screening tests means that symptomless people are encouraged to accept regular testing.

“A screening test is only going to be useful,” he said, “if it is given annually or biannually.” Then the odds of cancer mortality become much higher. “If a 45-year-old has annual full-body scans until the age of 75 years, then one in 50 will die of a radiation-induced cancer,” estimates Dr. Brenner, who is a radiation biologist, that is, a specialist in the health effects of radiation on the human body. For anyone who starts the same regimen at age 60 years, the odds of a radiation-induced cancer death would be one in 220.

Brenner and Elliston based the estimates of lifetime cancer death risk on the atomic bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki who had been exposed to the lowest amounts of radiation. The doses received by these survivors are comparable to those received from full-body scans.

The use of computed tomography, or CT scans, for symptomless people is relatively new. In addition to searching for early-stage cancers, heart scans for calcium in the coronary arteries are also heavily advertised to consumers. Most people undergo screening heart or full-body CT scans at freestanding clinics run by entrepreneurial radiologists, and the $300 to $1,000 cost is usually paid by the consumer. Insurance companies and managed care plans typically do not reimburse for screening CT scans because their benefit is yet to be proven. Furthermore, screening scans lead to false alarms and unnecessary, sometimes risky, testing and biopsies.

There are no statistics regarding the number of people who undergo screening CT scans each year, but there has been a dramatic increase in the number of freestanding CT scan clinics since 2001. Because radiation’s harm is cumulative, there have always been questions surrounding the safety of scanning people without symptoms. Brenner and Elliston are the first to quantify the radiation exposure.

A full-body scan means radiation is delivered from the chin to just below the hips. “The reason for the high radiation dose is that the machine fires in beams of x-rays from different directions providing 3D images—that’s why it’s called computerized tomography,” explained Dr. Brenner. “The patient is getting many separate x-rays. And that’s why the doses are much higher than those from conventional x-rays.”

Dr. Brenner made a distinction between the use of CT scans as a screening method and their use in diagnosing illness in a person with symptoms. The benefit of receiving the correct diagnosis outweighs the radiation risk. “If, say, a person has lung symptoms, the radiation dose [from the lung scan] goes only to that organ plus a small dose to the stomach because x-rays scatter.” But full-body scans are imaging the main organs of the body so they give a significant radiation dose to all those organs.

Unfortunately, it has always been difficult to find honest information about the radiation risks of medical tests. Radiologists have traditionally dismissed medical radiation exposure concerns. A recent survey indicates that physicians who order CT scans may be the least likely to be knowledgeable about radiation risks. Last May, a Yale survey of radiologists and emergency room physicians found that most of them did not believe that scans could increase the risk of cancer.

It is unusual for a medical group or a federal agency to come out a against screening test, but the American College of Radiology does not recommend full-body screening scans and the American Heart Association* does not recommend screening heart scans, citing concerns about the lack of proven benefit and the risks of overtreatment. Neither is explicit about the radiation risks; but the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a notable exception.

On its Web site, the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health comes right out and states that the use of CT scans to screen symptomless people has “no proven benefit.” To help people understand the amount of radiation involved, the agency has a radiation dose comparison chart showing, for example, that the radiation received by a CT scan of the abdomen is the equivalent of 500 chest x-rays.

The scans won’t give you peace of mind (a typical selling point), according to the FDA Web site, because a normal finding may erroneously be identified as cancer or a “clean bill of health” may be inaccurate. One would hope there was some independent oversight. Here too, the FDA is explicit about what it does not have the authority to do: “The FDA does not establish dose limits, nor does it address the imaging performance or efficacy of the CT equipment.”

For More Information:

Go the Web site of the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health.

To read why the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force is against the use of screening heart scans for calcium in the coronary arteries, go to www.ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstf/uspsacad.htm.

Read these two 2009 articles: one about the excessive amount of radiation associated with CT scans and the other about the radiation dose involved in cardiac CT scans.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers ©
October 2004

Posted in Cancer, Children's Health, Screening, Women's Health | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off

Advertising Drugs To The Public: A Bad Idea

Posted by medconsumers on May 1, 2004

Center for Medical Consumers to the FDA: Rein in Those Deceptive Ads

The FDA is currently rethinking its guidelines for corporations that advertise their prescription drugs and medical devices to consumers. Don’t think that the regulatory agency has your best interests at heart. For one thing, the FDA cannot screen the ads for accuracy before they are unleashed upon the public, nor does it have the staff to track all the print and broadcast ads after the fact. The new guidelines currently under consideration by the FDA are just as wimpy as the old ones. The FDA can only provide guidance to the drug and device industries thereby living up to its reputation as a toothless tiger.

In a perfect world, one where the FDA actually served the public’s interest, these ads would be abolished altogether. That’s never going to happen. Here’s the Center for Medical Consumers’ pie-in-the-sky recommendations that the FDA is unlikely to follow:

  • Make those entrepreneurial radiologists hawking whole-body scans and heart scans reveal the risks in their ads. They should be made to identify the radiation doses involved, as well as the high likelihood that scans will lead to unnecessary biopsies and detection of a type of cancer that would have remained dormant. As things stand now, a company can advertise any outrageous claim about, say, its digital mammography or scans with impunity as long as the brand name of the equipment is not revealed in the ad.
  • Include the rate of effectiveness in all ads. Only about 10% of all drug ads currently address this important issue; the rest give the impression that everyone benefits from the product. To get FDA approval, a drug must prove to be better than nothing (i.e., a placebo). Let the public know how much better.
  • Stop telling us that drug advertising is a good form of consumer education. Ads are designed to sell a product, not to provide balanced information. That’s why you see so many ads devoted to new, i.e., expensive, “me-too” drugs (think: Celebrex and Vioxx, Prilosec and Nexium, Lipitor and Zocor). That’s why you see little in the way of education— just a few promising words in the headlines like power and strength.
  • Abolish all “disease awareness” ads. They masquerade as public service announcements because no drug is named. This type of ad is all about selling fear of a disease, the need for testing, and drumming up customers for lifelong drug therapy. Merck, maker of the osteoporosis drug, Fosamax, provides a classic example: “Osteoporosis—could you be at risk…. ask your doctor whether a bone density test is right for you.”
  • Don’t allow companies to advertise diagnostic or screening tests to the public without proof that the new technologies are better than the old. Ads touting the expensive Pap screening technology called ThinPrep are a case in point. Such promotional activities have raised the cost of Pap testing without improving the accuracy of finding cervical cancer. To gain FDA approval, the maker of ThinPrep (and any other screening technology) has to prove only that it could find cancer, not that it is any better at finding cancer than the standard Pap test.
  • Be straight with the public about the limits of FDA testing requirements. Each ad should have a disclaimer, such as: To be approved by the FDA, a drug has only to be proven safe and more effective than a placebo, not better than older drugs prescribed for the same condition. The drug trials required for FDA approval typically last eight to 12 weeks.
  • Require the drug companies to list a few of the most common and most serious side effects in the body of the ad. Print ads are currently mandated to include the misnamed “brief summary” in tiny type on the reverse side of the ad. Anyone who reads the entire brief summary—and not many people do—will appreciate the concept of befuddling the public with too much information.
  • Speed up the process for pulling a misleading ad. The FDA usually waits for someone to complain about a misleading ad. Then the agency takes too long to remove it, according to a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office. What’s more, there is no penalty. Corrective ads are rare, though deception is not. We were cheered to see the recent corrective ad for Pravachol, the cholesterol-lowering drug. Its maker, Bristol-Myers Squibb, had to run full-page ads in such publications as The New York Times and Parade, stating that Pravachol “has not been proven to help prevent stroke in people without heart disease. Pravachol is proven to help prevent stroke only in people with coronary heart disease.” [Note: Though most ad complaints come from a competing drug maker, according to an FDA spokesman, the Bristol-Myers Squibb lie was found by FDA staff.]

Our suggestions to the FDA were made last month in a letter written in response to the agency’s request for comments on its guidance to industry. We do not have high hopes that they will be taken seriously given the current political climate. (Political contributions from the drug industry totaled $29 million in 2002.) The FDA’s hands are tied by a Congress unwilling to release the necessary funds or rein in the pharmaceutical industry. Meanwhile, drug costs continue to rise, much of it because advertising promotes the most expensive new drugs, not necessarily the safest or best drugs.

Maryann Napoli, Center for Medical Consumers(c)

Posted in Drug ads | Tagged: , , | Comments Off

Deceptive Drug And Device Ads

Posted by medconsumers on May 1, 2004

Center for Medical Consumers to FDA: Rein In Those Deceptive Drug Ads

The FDA is currently rethinking its guidelines for corporations that advertise their prescription drugs and medical devices to consumers. Don’t think that the regulatory agency has your best interests at heart. For one thing, the FDA cannot screen the ads for accuracy before they are unleashed upon the public, nor does it have the staff to track all the print and broadcast ads after the fact. The new guidelines currently under consideration by the FDA are just as wimpy as the old ones. The FDA can only provide guidance to the drug and device industries thereby living up to its reputation as a toothless tiger.

In a perfect world, one where the FDA actually served the public’s interest, these ads would be abolished altogether. That’s never going to happen. Here’s the Center for Medical Consumers’ pie-in-the-sky recommendations that the FDA is unlikely to follow:

  • Make those entrepreneurial radiologists hawking whole-body scans and heart scans reveal the risks in their ads. They should be made to identify the radiation doses involved, as well as the high likelihood that scans will lead to unnecessary biopsies and detection of a type of cancer that would have remained dormant. As things stand now, a company can advertise any outrageous claim about, say, its digital mammography or scans with impunity as long as the brand name of the equipment is not revealed in the ad.
  • Include the rate of effectiveness in all ads. Only about 10% of all drug ads currently address this important issue; the rest give the impression that everyone benefits from the product. To get FDA approval, a drug must prove to be better than nothing (i.e., a placebo). Let the public know how much better.
  • Stop telling us that drug advertising is a good form of consumer education. Ads are designed to sell a product, not to provide balanced information. That’s why you see so many ads devoted to new, i.e., expensive, “me-too” drugs (think: Celebrex and Vioxx, Prilosec and Nexium, Lipitor and Zocor). That’s why you see little in the way of education— just a few promising words in the headlines like power and strength .
  • Abolish all “disease awareness” ads. They masquerade as public service announcements because no drug is named. This type of ad is all about selling fear of a disease, the need for testing, and drumming up customers for lifelong drug therapy. Merck, maker of the osteoporosis drug, Fosamax, provides a classic example: “Osteoporosis—could you be at risk…. ask your doctor whether a bone density test is right for you.”
  • Don’t allow companies to advertise diagnostic or screening tests to the public without proof that the new technologies are better than the old. Ads touting the expensive Pap screening technology called ThinPrep are a case in point. Such promotional activities have raised the cost of Pap testing without improving the accuracy of finding cervical cancer. To gain FDA approval, the maker of ThinPrep (and any other screening technology) has to prove only that it could find cancer, not that it is any better at finding cancer than the standard Pap test.
  • Be straight with the public about the limits of FDA testing requirements. Each ad should have a disclaimer, such as: To be approved by the FDA, a drug has only to be proven safe and more effective than a placebo, not better than older drugs prescribed for the same condition. The drug trials required for FDA approval typically last eight to 12 weeks.
  • Require the drug companies to list a few of the most common and most serious side effects in the body of the ad. Print ads are currently mandated to include the misnamed “brief summary” in tiny type on the reverse side of the ad. Anyone who reads the entire brief summary—and not many people do—will appreciate the concept of befuddling the public with too much information.
  • Speed up the process for pulling a misleading ad. The FDA usually waits for someone to complain about a misleading ad. Then the agency takes too long to remove it, according to a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office. What’s more, there is no penalty. Corrective ads are rare, though deception is not. We were cheered to see the recent corrective ad for Pravachol, the cholesterol-lowering drug. Its maker, Bristol-Myers Squibb, had to run full-page ads in such publications as The New York Times and Parade, stating that Pravachol “has not been proven to help prevent stroke in people without heart disease. Pravachol is proven to help prevent stroke only in people with coronary heart disease.” [Note: Though most ad complaints come from a competing drug maker, according to an FDA spokesman, the Bristol-Myers Squibb lie was found by FDA staff.]

Our suggestions to the FDA were made last month in a letter written in response to the agency’s request for comments on its guidance to industry. We do not have high hopes that they will be taken seriously given the current political climate. (Political contributions from the drug industry totaled $29 million in 2002.) The FDA’s hands are tied by a Congress unwilling to release the necessary funds or rein in the pharmaceutical industry. Meanwhile, drug costs continue to rise, much of it because advertising promotes the most expensive new drugs, not necessarily the safest or best drugs.

Maryann Napoli
May 2004

Posted in Drug ads, Drugs | Tagged: , , , | Comments Off

Accurately Written Prescription Drug Information

Posted by medconsumers on July 31, 2003

FDA Should Require Accurate Written Prescription Drug Information For Consumers

The following comments were presented at an FDA meeting in Washington DC on July 31, 2003, and formally submitted to the FDA docket.

The Current Status of the Private Sector’s Efforts to Provide Useful Written Prescription Drug Information to Consumers
(Docket No. 03N-0168)

Submitted By: Arthur A. Levin, MPH, Director
The Center for Medical Consumers

Thank you for the opportunity to present my comments today on this important consumer protection issue. I am responding to the FDA’s request for comment in my capacity as Director of the Center for Medical Consumers, a non-profit consumer advocacy organization located in New York City.

In the spirit of full disclosure I would like to state for the record that the Center is a 501c3 not for profit organization and does not receive any grants from the health care industry, including any manufacturer of drugs, devices, biologics or medical equipment. You should also know that I served as a member of the congressionally established Steering Committee for the Collaborative Development of a Long-Range Action Plan for the Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information that issued its report to HHS in December 1996. And, I am currently the consumer member of the FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DSaRM).

Since it’s founding in 1976, the Center has advocated on behalf of the rights of consumers and patients to know everything there is to know about a prescription drug or medical device. I believe that open access to this information is critical to patient safety, and a necessary condition of informed decision-making and informed consent. And I would suggest that the demonstrated decades of failure of the various private sector interests to provide high quality written prescription drug information to consumers should be a matter of urgent concern from what is after all, a public health agency.

People define the goals of providing consumers and patients with written information about their prescription drugs from different perspectives. Some see it as a means to improve patient “compliance” with drug regimens, others as a way to encourage people to take the drugs prescribed to them and still other as a means of educating people about proper use. I have a different set of priorities in mind. The first is that of protecting consumers from the risks inherent in prescription drugs; second, providing the means by which a patient can give informed consent to taking a drug in the first place and third is optimizing the benefits of the medication.

The FDA asked that public comment address four questions that were posed in the Federal Register notice of this meeting. The first two are really more appropriate for an industry response – so I will comment only on the last two.

What should the role of the FDA be in assuring full implementation of the Action Plan to meet the Year 2006 goal?

To my mind the answer is simple: The FDA should mandate the distribution of “useful” written consumer drug information with all prescriptions and only count as “useful” the written information that conforms to the Action Plan guidelines for content and format. These guidelines represent a set of criteria for judging the “quality” of the information and after development by the Steering Committee were formally accepted by the Secretary of Health & Human Services.

Useful Written Drug Information for Consumers: An Urgent Public Health Priority

In its 2001 report, Crossing the Quality Chasm, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America wrote:

“Health care today harms too frequently and routinely fails to deliver its potential benefits”.

That preventable patient harm from prescription drugs is an urgent public health problem is to my mind beyond question. Consider the following: PharmaTrends, an industry data analyst firm estimates that 3,340,000,000 outpatient prescriptions were written in 2002. That’s an average of 10 prescriptions a year for every woman, man and child in America. That’s also 3, 340,000,000 opportunities for a patient to be injured by a preventable medication error; to be unaware that a drug’s risks may exceed its benefits or not to understand that perhaps they shouldn’t have been prescribed or dispensed a particular drug in the first place.

The evidence of serious harm to patients as a result of medication errors, adverse drug reactions and drug interactions is substantial and growing. Because of this overwhelming evidence it is, I believe, unconscionable for industry and health professional self-interest to be permitted to take precedence over the well-being and safety of patients. But that is exactly what has happened over the past twenty-five years. In my view, the time for government’s continued reliance on a demonstrably failed voluntary, private sector effort is over.

Why is written drug information for consumer so important? Well, for one thing experts have suggested that a meaningful reduction in patient harm could be achieved if consumers and patients were better informed about the drugs they take. In its 1999 report on medical errors, the IOM’s Committee of the Quality of Health Care recommended that:

“A major unused resource in most hospitals, clinics and practices is the patient. Not only do patients have a right to know the medications they are receiving, the reasons for them, their expected effects and possible complications, they should also know what the pills or injections look like and how often they are to receive them.”

Historically, face-to-face prescription drug counseling by doctors and pharmacists has been viewed as the principal means to inform patients. In fact, physicians like to refer to their roles as “the learned intermediary.” Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence suggesting that prescribers and dispensers spend little or no time counseling patients about the prescriptions they take. Also, in our current financially stressed health care system, doctors, nurses and pharmacists complain that they have less and less time to spend with individual patients. And there are some logistical complications; for example a growing number of patients receive their prescriptions at home by mail either from pharmacy benefit managers or because they have been purchased thru the Internet.

There is also good reason to believe that the drug information imparted by prescribers may not necessarily be scientifically accurate, up to date or free of professional or specialty bias. I would also suggest that there is little disagreement that the amount of information flowing from published studies, the National Institutes of Health, specialty society guidelines, protocols, care maps and the like is simply overwhelming. Many experts believe it is humanely impossible for a single clinician to keep up. In others words, your intermediary may not be so “learned.”

It seems unlikely, based on what we know (or don’t know) about changing professional behavior that rapid progress can be made to change professional behavior so that evidence-based prescribing and dispensing is the norm. Also, it would take a revolution in the way health care is currently organized and financed to encourage sufficient time and incentives for doctors, nurses and pharmacists to spend the time necessary to counsel patients and to do so without any bias based on their professional or entrepreneur interests. And lastly, we cannot ignore the pernicious influence of industry’s intense product promotions to doctors and pharmacists in shaping their knowledge base about the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs. Because of these realities, an FDA mandate that prescriptions be accompanied by high quality written consumer drug information is, I respectfully suggest, a critical, absolutely appropriate “safety net” to protect patients from harm.

Thirty-Five Years in the Making and Still Counting:

Today, we have been asked by the agency to once again provide comment and guidance about the provision of written prescription drug information to consumers. We are re-visiting this issue in July 2003 – some 35 years after the FDA first required that labeling written in non-technical language be given to consumers whenever certain prescription drugs or devices were dispensed. I think that to fully understand why we are having this meeting three decades after a written consumer information initiative was first undertaken by the FDA, it is important to have a sense of the history of efforts to provide better consumer information about the risks and benefits of prescription drugs

Tom McGiness has provided us with a short history of the battles over written drug information for consumers. That history tells us that FDA has made several politically frustrated attempts to ensure that quality written drug information is in the hands of consumers when they need it.

Since 1968, despite seemingly broad agreement that providing better information to consumers about their prescription drugs is a laudable, potentially health-enhancing goal, we have witnessed a contentious struggle over how best to accomplish that task, what such information should include and whose responsibility is it to produce, distribute and evaluate the information.

A proposal to mandate broad distribution of PPIs was finalized by the Carter administration in 1979. It was subsequently withdrawn by the FDA after newly elected President Reagan rejected the initiative, which various industries, professional groups and conservatives in Congress saw as a example of government excess, in favor of a “hands off” private sector approach – a bias that has dominated this public policy discussion ever since.

Eight years ago, in what I would characterize as a frank acknowledgment of the failure of the private sector to achieve the desired goals of the 1980 PPI program after some fifteen years of effort, the FDA published a new proposed rule in The Federal Register titled “Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements” [Docket No. 93N-0371].

In the narrative accompanying the proposed rule the FDA noted that:

“During the hearing that led to the withdrawal of the 1980 PPI regulations, promises were made by representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, medical and pharmacy community that if FDA withdrew the PPI regulations, the private sector would develop a variety of systems that would meet the goals of the proposed PPI program. These promises have not yet been fulfilled.”

While the 1995 proposed rule, quickly dubbed “Med Guides,” still looked to the private sector to deliver on its promises, the agency at least recognized the need to establish criteria for what comprised “useful” written information. This important step meant that: (1) there could be uniformity and consistency in the information provided; and (2) there would be assurance that the information provided consumers is scientifically accurate and otherwise “useful” as defined by the FDA. Models for consistent labeling exist in food labels and the newly redesigned OTC drug labeling. Perhaps most important, a set of common criteria provide the tools with which to objectively evaluate the quality of the drug information being published and distributed by the private sector.

In support of the 1995 proposed Med Guide rule, the FDA argued that:

“…improved dissemination of accurate, thorough and understandable information about prescription drug products is necessary to fulfill patients’ need and right to be informed.”

When the FDA convened a two-day meeting to discuss the proposed rule, it was trashed by every professional and industry group, including doctors, information publishers, pharmacy trade associations, pharmacists and others.

The objections of trade and professionals associations ultimately held sway in Congress. The FDA was “banned” implement its Med Guide proposal or any other mandate under Public Law 104-180 enacted in 1996. The law directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to convene the Steering Committee for the Collaborative Development of a Long-Range Action Plan for the Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information. The Steering Committee, with a diverse membership of 34 pharmacy, pharmacist, information publisher, professional and consumer organizations hammered out an Action Plan” for the Secretary in the required 120 days. The Action Plan, somewhat surprisingly, contained content and format criteria that were almost identical to Med Guides and that were accepted by the Secretary.

Private Sector Effort Evaluated in 2001 and Found Wanting:

The FDA, in compliance with the Action Plan and Public Law 104-180 contracted with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) for a national study to assess the usefulness of written information bring distributed to patients. A subcontractor, the University of Wisconsin, Madison School of Pharmacy, conducted a more in-depth evaluation that which relied on professional shoppers to collect the materials and both consumer and expert evaluators to judge the materials based on the criteria recommended in the Action Plan.

I would suggest that despite the somewhat positive tone adopted in FDA’s press releases when the study was released, the results of that evaluation in December 2001, provides strong evidence that more than two decades of private sector efforts have fallen considerably short of the Action Plan’s goals.

Even though I have some reservations about the way in which Action Plan criteria were judged by the expert, the results still to point to serious shortfalls in regard to patient safety. For example Table #3 in the 2001 evaluation reports tells us that for all four drugs studied, the mean level of adherence to Action Plan criteria hovered at about 50%. None achieved the highest level of quality. Now when I went to school decades ago getting 50% on an evaluation was a failing grade. And the self congratulation about the fact that almost 90% of consumers seem to be getting some information is a mixed blessing: half are receiving poor quality information that may actually do more harm that not having any information at all.

The FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DsaRM) met one year ago to consider whether, based on the University of Wisconsin evaluation of written information provided in community pharmacies, the private sector had achieved the Year 2001 goal established by the Action Plan. My position at that meeting was, that based on the results of the evaluation, the voluntary, private sector effort had clearly failed to meet the Action Plan’s 2001 interim goal. I argued that the FDA, under the authority granted by Public Law 104-180, should take appropriate steps to ensure that the Action Plan’s 2006 goal for provision of “useful” written information to consumers would be met. Well as I have already suggested, there is only one responsible action for the FDA – and that is to proactively enforce the Action Plan criteria by mandating that written information, meeting the Action Plan criteria (and at more than a 50% “pass rate”), be dispensed with every prescription.

The fourth question posed by the FDA was:

What other initiatives should FDA consider for providing patients with useful written information about prescription drugs?

Isn’t it time to move to consider a broad move to unit of use packaging? I can only guess why has it, while embraced in Europe, has been so strongly resisted in the U.S. healthcare system

I would argue that unit of use packaging presents real opportunities for improving patient safety related to written information, as well as in other ways. For example, moving to unit of use packaging would allow FDA to mandate that drug manufacturers be the responsible party for the provision of “useful” written consumer information since they would have to incorporate with the unit of use package provided to dispensers. Written information could be evaluated prior to new drug or indication approval so that we get information to consumers, which is as close to 100% compliant with Action Plan criteria as humanely possible. Unit of use packaging incorporating written consumer information eliminates any distribution failures; it allows standardization of the content and format of information and the information stays with the packaging, and thus the patient, for the full course of the treatment. And of course, unit of use packaging provides other safety benefits, such as making it easy to recognize a missed dose.

Note: In 1998 the FDA was given the OK to require drug makers supply Medication Guides with certain highly problematic drugs. To date, less than two-dozen such guides have been required, including ones for the drugs Accutane (isotretinoin), Lotronex (alosetron), Nolvadex (tamoxifen) and Mifeprex (mifepristone) and all forms of the biologic interferon.

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Two New Books about Hormones

Posted by medconsumers on July 1, 2003

Two New Books that take a Critical Look at Hormone Therapy
By Maryann Napoli
(July 2003)

The bad news about postmenopausal hormones came in increments. In July 2002, the Women’s Health Initiative trial was stopped prematurely because the estrogen/progestin combination drug called Prempro was-over a five-year period-causing more diseases than it was preventing. Then eight months later, the WHI produced another unexpected finding: hormone drugs aren’t all that helpful to women taking them to alleviate hot flashes.

In time, widely advertised hopes that estrogen could prevent Alzheimer’s disease were dashed when the WHI showed that the women taking Prempro had a higher rate of this much-feared disorder. And if that weren’t bad enough, last month a study involving one million British women found a substantially higher rate of breast cancer deaths among those had taken combination hormones than those who did not or those who took estrogen alone (The Lancet, 8/9/03).

So many questions remain. Why were gynecologists unanimously convinced that long-term hormone “replacement” therapy would prevent heart disease? Why were the adverse effects shown only for combination hormones and not estrogen alone? Are there any safe and effective alternatives for women who were taking hormones to alleviate menopausal symptoms? Two new books provide some answers.

For Susan M. Love, MD, the much admired breast surgeon, the underlying question that the WHI raises for her is why women need to replace hormones in the long term. Women require high levels of hormones to reproduce, she says, then they shift down to lower levels for the second half of life. In her latest book, Dr. Susan Love’s Menopause & Hormone Book, written with Karen Lindsey (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003), Dr. Love notes that the marketing of hormone “replacement” therapy went hand in hand with the idea that once menopause begins, a heart attack or hip fracture will soon follow. Diseases of aging, like heart disease and osteoporosis, were reclassified as diseases caused by menopause. Both were portrayed as estrogen-deficiency diseases.

In The Greatest Experiment Every Performed on Women: Exploding the Estrogen Myth (NewYork: Hyperion, 2003), journalist Barbara Seaman writes that many women injured by hormones were bullied by their doctors into taking estrogen that they didn’t want or need; now many of them are being bullied by lawyers who also may not know what they are doing. In her 1969 ground-breaking book The Doctors’ Case Against the Pill, Seaman almost single-handedly started the women’s health movement when she brought public attention to the serious, sometimes fatal, health risks associated with oral contraceptives because the products sold in the 1960s had more than ten times the amount of hormones needed to prevent pregnancy.

The Greatest Experiment starts 65 years ago when a British biochemist published his formula for a cheap and powerful oral estrogen. Within months, writes Seaman, thousands of doctors and scores of drug companies around the world were working with this formula, prescribing it to slow and prevent aging, to stop hot flashes, to avoid pregnancy or miscarriage, and as a morning-after contraceptive. The risks of these drugs were known and documented from the start, according to Seaman, whose research shows that the British doctor who published his estrogen formula in 1938 spent many years warning that, though these drugs had great promise, they also put women at serious peril. He would become the first of several doctors to warn about giving hormones to healthy women.

Seaman, whose aunt died of estrogen drug-induced endometrial cancer, takes us through the subsequent decades of early failed attempts to study estrogen’s safety and efficacy as a contraceptive; the widespread prescription of the synthetic estrogen called DES to prevent miscarriage (it couldn’t, but that didn’t stop its use); the marketing of estrogen as an anti-aging panacea; and then brings the reader right up to recent years when healthy women were told to take estrogen to prevent heart disease and hip fractures. The injuries and deaths that occurred along the way did not seem to deter doctors and drug companies, nor did the lack of evidence to support the broad range of health claims. (Research has proven estrogen to be safe and effective only for alleviating symptoms of natural and surgical menopause.)

Seaman provides a behind-the-scenes view of the effectiveness of the women’s health activists who can be credited for-among many other things-getting written information about side effects, warnings, etc. mandated for all hormone drugs. When Wyeth-Ayerst asked the FDA to approve its estrogen drug Premarin for the prevention of heart disease, no professional medical society objected to the request. It was Cindy Pearson of the National Women’s Health Network who was the most vigorous dissenter. She successfully pressured the FDA to have the written information include the fact that estrogen has never been proven to prevent heart disease.

At a 1996 FDA meeting about the perennial fight to have written information with all prescription drugs, Seaman managed to get the then head of the AMA to admit publicly why his organization has been so adamantly against the idea. Dr. Roy Schwartz conceded Seaman’s points-that the provision of written information for hormone drugs had saved lives and reduced malpractice suits. Almost half of all prescriptions are written for conditions that are unproven, he explained. Doctors don’t want their patients to know they are getting a drug for [what is called] an off-label use, continued Dr. Schwartz, adding that people might sue their doctors for an injury incurred by a drug prescribed off-label.

While Seaman’s book provides the historical perspective that should make any reader into an educated skeptic once the next “miracle” drug comes along, Love’s book takes on the question of what menopausal women can do now that the all-purpose menopausal drug has been knocked from its pedestal. There are lots of options for women who want to prevent diseases of aging without resorting to estrogen, she writes, offering five chapters on non-drug approaches to symptom relief, as well as lifestyle changes. Some women suffer so severely from night sweats and hot flashes that they are willing to risk taking the drug for a year or so. Love provides easy-to-understand ways of weighing risks, not only of taking the combination hormones but also of developing the diseases of aging. In the WHI, taking estrogen alone, a choice available only to women without a uterus, appears to be safe-for now. This is the only group of participants allowed to continue to the trial’s originally intended end in 2006. As new research becomes available, Love advises women to be prepared to reevaluate their decisions.

One way for drug companies to sell mid-life women on the idea of lifelong hormone therapy was to sell fear of a potentially fatal hip fracture. Never mind that the odds of this occurring before age 70 are pretty slim. (Ironically, the WHI provided the first scientific evidence that combination hormones actually can reduce the rate of hip fracture.) Osteoporosis moved into the female collective consciousness in the 1980s. The chief culprit was purportedly loss of estrogen. What was once a risk factor (bone loss) has been turned into a disease, writes Love. Not so long ago, a woman did not have osteoporosis unless she had a fracture. A panel of international experts redefined osteoporosis as “a disease characterized by low bone mass and microarchitectural deterioration of bone tissue, which lead to increased bone fragility and a consequent increase in fracture risk.”

This greatly expands the number of people who now have a disease, writes Love, who observed that doctors and drug companies have focused women solely on the first half of that definition-low bone density. However, some researchers have found that bone architecture, or bone strength, is a far better determinant of who will suffer a hip fracture. No test can accurately measure bone strength so doctors test what they can-bone density-and continue to rely on dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA). This test, suggested for all women over age 60 in osteoporosis ads by Merck, the maker of an osteoporosis drug, has caused many women to be diagnosed with what Love thinks is a made up condition. Osteopenia (reduced bone mass) is not a disease and not even a risk factor, she writes, and should not be treated. However, a DEXA-produced diagnosis of osteopenia led many a woman to an estrogen prescription.

Both books are written by women who have been at the vortex of the estrogen controversy for many years. Both authors are high-profile activists long known to have women’s best interests at heart.

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Letter To FDA Opposing Use of Surrogate Endpoints for Approval of Cancer Prevention Drugs

Posted by medconsumers on June 26, 2003

This letter was mailed to the FDA commissioner on June 26, 2003. It is an open letter that went to various medical reporters.

June 26, 2003

Dear Dr. McClellan:

The undersigned consumer advocacy organizations write to express our alarm at the behind-the-scenes efforts by Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach and Dr. Anna Barker to undermine the FDA’s drug approval requirements.(1) Their proposal to use surrogate endpoints for the approval of cancer chemoprevention drugs should be rejected by the FDA.

Because these potentially harmful drugs will be given to healthy people, it is all the more imperative that the FDA not relax its approval standards. In fact, manufacturers of chemoprevention agents should be required to prove that their drugs reduce cancer-specific mortality as well as all-cause mortality. The need to address all-cause mortality for drugs given to healthy people is best illustrated by the first 20 years of cholesterol research. Randomized controlled trials showed that the reduced rate of cardiovascular mortality in healthy but high-risk men given cholesterol-lowering drugs was offset by a higher rate of overall mortality. (2)

There are many examples of surrogate endpoints that eventually proved to be wrong. Because postmenopausal hormones could reduce cholesterol, this was thought to be a good surrogate for heart disease prevention-until the Women’s Health Initiative showed they caused more cardiovascular events.(3) The validity of surrogate endpoints-even for cancer treatment drugs-has been controversial for over 15 years.(3) That controversy will only be exacerbated in the context of a drug for the treatment of non-invasive lesions and “precancers,” given the fact that so many resolve spontaneously or remain dormant..(4)

There is much to be learned from the 1998 approval of tamoxifen for “prevention,” once the drug halved the breast cancer incidence in the P-1 Trial. Now, women are justifiably concerned about the safety of taking an anti-cancer drug with potentially fatal side effects simply because a doctor deemed them high risk. (5) Several of the undersigned pointed out to the FDA’s Oncologic Drug Advisory Committee that the P-1 Trial’s failure to prove tamoxifen can reduce breast cancer mortality left the lingering question of whether the drug merely delays the onset of breast cancer.

It is shocking to learn that federal employees-particularly two who head the NCI-are meeting behind closed doors with a representative of the drug industry to influence drug approval policy and to change the product liability laws. Any change in the product liability laws will almost certainly have long-lasting implications in many arenas. We look to the FDA to take the proper steps to follow its mandate and protect the public’s interest.

Sincerely,

Maryann Napoli
Center for Medical Consumers
Judy Norsigian
Boston Womens Health Collective

Barbara Brenner
Breast Cancer Action, San Francisco

Sharon Batt
Women and Health Protection, Canada

Deborah Forter
Massachusetts Breast Cancer Coalition
Cindy Pearson
National Women’s Health Network

_____________________________

(1) Goldberg, P. NCI Deputy Barker Hits FDA, Calls for New Incentives for Pharmaceutical Industry. The Cancer Letter, May 30, 2003.
(2) Moore Thomas J. Heart Failure. New York: Touchtone Books/Simon & Schuster, 1989
(3)Rossouw JE et al. Risks and benefits of estrogen plus progestin in healthy postmenopausal women: principal results from the Women’s Health Initiative randomized controlled trial. JAMA 2002;288:321-33.
(4) Raffle AE et al. Detection rates for abnormal cervical smears: what are we screening for? Lancet 1995;345:1469-73
(5) Port ER et al. Patient reluctance toward tamoxifen use for breast cancer primary prevention. Ann Surg Oncol 2001:8:580-5.

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Are Consumers Fully Informed About Cancer Drugs Given Accelerated Approval?

Posted by medconsumers on March 12, 2003

These remarks were made during the public comment period at the FDA’s Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, March 12, 2003

I am Maryann Napoli, the associate director of the Center for Medical Consumers in New York. We are a non-profit advocacy organization that has never taken pharmaceutical industry funding.

Because our center was founded to promote informed medical decision-making, I have spent a lot of time listening to people and helping them make cancer treatment decisions. In 25 of the 27 years of our Center’s existence, we have had a medical library that is open to the public. The people we attract are those who weigh and consider the evidence before going on a cancer drug regimen. In the years I’ve spent listening to people, I have been struck by the disconnect between what the oncologists say to their patients and what the patients hear. For example, oncologists, when asked about efficacy, often use the term response rate, but the patient inevitably hears survival rate.

I think that most people would be shocked to know how unreliable tumor response is as an endpoint and that it was the basis for the accelerated approval (AA) of ten out of 11 cancer drugs and the sole basis for 10 of the 55 drugs given regular approval between 1990 and 20011. Consider what most cancer patients want from a drug-a significantly prolonged life without side effects that are too horrendous. I applaud current efforts to make clinical benefit the required endpoint. And I’m glad that ODAC is rethinking the AA process because it allows expensive, minimally tested drugs on the market to enjoy a long period of unearned hope and acceptance. AA drugs have never been compared to the standard care to determine whether they are better or worse.

No matter what you decide to do as a committee, cancer patients must have a way of understanding the basis for approval, be it regular or accelerated. I have looked at the label for each of the drugs to be discussed at this meeting and concluded that the average intelligent consumer could easily miss their AA status when reading the Physicians’ Desk Reference. Sure, you can read the label and see descriptions of Phase II trials that show complete or partial responses. But what does that mean to consumers? And yes, people can go to the FDA web site where they can see the list of drugs given AA. But the explanation of AA is not readily understandable, nor does it explain tumor response and how debatable it is as a good surrogate for prolonged survival or even symptom improvement.

Most manufacturers of drugs given AA haven’t completed the required phase IV trials, but you’d be hard pressed to find that out-unless you read the Wall Street Journal.2 The FDA web site lists each drug’s date of approval, but not the status of those required phase IV trials. We advocates who write, “translate,” and assimilate information for people with cancer need to know this information. We need to know whether companies are complying with this regulation and how long it is taking them to do so.

All cancer drugs should come with written information that is understandable for the average intelligent consumer who needs a summary of the supporting scientific evidence. In fact, there should be something like a black box warning to alert the consumer of a drug’s AA status.

For additional information see “How Well Tested Are the New Cancer Drugs?

__
1 Telephone interview with Richard Pazdur, MD. Director of Oncologic Drug Products, FDA, August 28, 2002 in preparation for article entitled “How Well Tested are the Newest Cancer Drugs?” September 2002 issue of HealthFacts newsletter, published by the Center for Medical Consumers.
2 Chris Adams. “Test Data for Some Drugs Long Overdue at the FDA.” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2003.

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